A quick and effective active internal intersection attack for deanonymizing Bob
Add a few nodes to the cluster and peer up with many nodes. Send the target address a message with ackdata. Wait to see the ackdata published anywhere, to know the target got the message. Quickly send getdata messages to all peers requesting the ackdata msg. Create two lists, one containing all peers that have the ackdata msg and one containing all peers that do not. The peers that do not have the ackdata msg can be eliminated as suspects. Rinse and repeat until there is only one suspect. Only sending getdata messages to the suspect nodes to speed things up.
The same can be done in reverse. Every time you get a message from the target, quickly send getdata messages to all nodes. Make your two lists again, and wait to get enough messages to identify the target.
If nodes never include messages sent from them in their inventories the attack can be inversed, looking for the node that doesn&#39;t have the message listed.
This intersection attack probably identify the IP address of a sender or receiver pretty quickly, and it only actually requires having a single node so long as it is peered with the entire cluster. Since clusters are inherently destined to be relatively small due to scalability issues, it should never be hard to peer with enough nodes to carry this attack out, especially if you have a few nodes on the network.
The reason I think this is the best attack is because it can be carried out by a very weak attacker, internal with a single node.
It looks like Bitmessage waits 0-10 seconds per peer to send a newly inserted message to every node on a clients peer list. It uses 32 threads for outgoing messages, I assume it replaces them as it goes. So assuming there are 1,000 nodes on the network and they all peer with each other, and assuming it takes only 1 second to send the message to each peer, that means it will take 31.25 seconds for the client to send its message to all peers. If Alice is in the set of 32 nodes the inserting client originally sends the message to, and she quickly queries all her peers to see if they have the message, (let&#39;s say she has a modified client that uses 1,000 threads, and it takes her 1 second to query nodes to see if they have the message), Alice will have a suspect list of 64 nodes that could have sent the message.
In the case of acks Alice doesn&#39;t even need to wait to see it published actually, she can constantly query all of her peers for it with its inventory vector (which she knows as she makes the ack data in the first place and the inventory vector is just a hash of it). This will probably be even more effective actually, as as soon as a node gets a message it has the ack for it and will respond to a getdata query for the ack I assume.
просто рассылай говно всем подряд и они будут его декриптовать, сжигая ресурсы ЦП зря. Ведь попытка расшифровки происходит при получении любых сообщений.>Ты ебанутый?